[cryptography] philosophical question about strengths and attacks at impossible levels
James A. Donald
jamesd at echeque.com
Tue Nov 23 18:01:29 EST 2010
On 2010-11-24 8:31 AM, travis+ml-rbcryptography at subspacefield.org wrote:
> Successful systems tend to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary
> when there's a non-trivial ecosystem around them.
The fundamental security flaw is that we have a name system that does
not scale. Evolution rather than revolution gets you stuck into non
At some point you have to break compatibility and implement a system
that does scale.
The DNS plan was that each entity would have a globally unique human
readable name - but in practice, cannot be done
We need a Zooko system, where an entities true name is the hash of the
cryptographic rule identifying the entity.
We already largely hide DNS rooted names - one's buddy list, contact
list, and bookmarks do not show them, and though they are still
displayed on the browser, no one ever looks at that part of the browser,
which failure to look is the basis of numerous attacks.
With cryptographic true names, we would have end to end encryption
everywhere, which would allow capabilities everywhere. A cryptographic
capability is a form of value, thus we would then be transferring value
across the internet, which at present we are profoundly reluctant to do.
> Is doing more of what you're already good at necessarily a bad
Doing more of what you are good at is a good strategy against nature.
Against bad people, it fails.
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