[cryptography] philosophical question about strengths and attacks at impossible levels

James A. Donald jamesd at echeque.com
Tue Nov 23 18:01:29 EST 2010

On 2010-11-24 8:31 AM, travis+ml-rbcryptography at subspacefield.org wrote:
> Successful systems tend to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary
> when there's a non-trivial ecosystem around them.

The fundamental security flaw is that we have a name system that does 
not scale.  Evolution rather than revolution gets you stuck into non 
scaling systems.

At some point you have to break compatibility and implement a system 
that does scale.

The DNS plan was that each entity would have a globally unique human 
readable name - but in practice, cannot be done

We need a Zooko system, where an entities true name is the hash of the 
cryptographic rule identifying the entity.

We already largely hide DNS rooted names - one's buddy list, contact 
list, and bookmarks do not show them, and though they are still 
displayed on the browser, no one ever looks at that part of the browser, 
which failure to look is the basis of numerous attacks.

With cryptographic true names, we would have end to end encryption 
everywhere, which would allow capabilities everywhere.  A cryptographic 
capability is a form of value, thus we would then be transferring value 
across the internet, which at present we are profoundly reluctant to do.

 > Is doing more of what you're already good at necessarily a bad
> strategy?

Doing more of what you are good at is a good strategy against nature. 
Against bad people, it fails.

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