[cryptography] Tahoe-LAFS developers' statement on backdoors

Rayservers support at rayservers.com
Thu Oct 7 05:42:17 EDT 2010


There is another option. Learn the Common Law, the Law of the Land.

http://1215.org/lawnotes/lawnotes/sovreign.htm
"...at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are
truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without
subjects...with none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal
as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty." CHISHOLM v.
GEORGIA (US) 2 Dall 419, 454, 1 L Ed 440, 455 @DALL 1793 pp471-472

Do you comprehend what that means...

If you are a citizen unit, then you are screwed:
http://1215.org/lawnotes/lawnotes/pvc.htm

American Citizens are those who have voluntarily given up their American
Nationality. American Citizens aka "persons" are de-facto corporations - are you
conscious of that?

A degree in "Law" from Harvard won't help.

On 07/10/10 05:39, Marsh Ray wrote:
> On 10/06/2010 06:42 PM, silky wrote:
>>>
>>> The core Tahoe developers promise never to change Tahoe-LAFS to
>>> facilitate government access to data stored or transmitted by it. Even
>>> if it were desirable to facilitate such access—which it is not—we
>>> believe it would not be technically feasible to do so without severely
>>> compromising Tahoe-LAFS' security against other attackers. [...]
> 
> You guys are my heroes.
> 
>> How will you stand by this if it becomes illegal not to comply though?
> 
> As an American software developer myself, I guess I need to consider
> this too. I could imagine a US open source developer might choose to:
> 
> 1. Quit developing security software and take up a new line of work,
> say, selling 0-days to the Russian Business Network. This is probably
> what much of the US data security industry will be reduced to, since
> obviously no one will want to buy backdoored data security products and
> services from US companies anymore (well, except outsourcers audited for
> conformance to US government procurement standards).
> 
> E.g. MIT Kerberos and Heimdal:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerberos_%28protocol%29#History_and_development
> 
> 
> The term "non-US" will once again be the universally recognized mark of
> effective cryptography. It's really a win-win for the former Eastern
> Block, as they'll gain a huge market as US purchasers begin obtaining
> their critical data security products from them.
> 
> Remember when the best stuff always seemed to come from ftp.cs.hut.fi?
> 
> 2. Comply by forking the codebase to a new "Backdoored-Tahoe-LAFS",
> (which of course nobody would ever use). Commit code to that repository
> and the free world could pull your patches out of it, if they want to.
> Of course, as a developer your source code management overhead would be
> twice as difficult as everyone else's. So you'd probably be doing the
> small, menial tasks and end up marginalized as the direction of new
> development gets set overseas.
> 
> 3. Emigrate to England where they apparently have other methods of
> cryptanalysis.
> 
> 4. Adopt a cool hacker alias (e.g. "Bobby Tables") for all your
> development work. Dress like someone from The Matrix, and add the
> glasses-nose-mustache disguise for good measure. Send all your email
> through spam relays, and originate all your network traffic from
> sympathetic human rights activist offices in China. Be sure to obtain
> all your development software from warez sites too.
> 
> 5. Protest the law, loudly and publicly. Become too well-known to
> prosecute for offenses of questionable constitutionality, grab headlines
> whenever possible. Get yourself accused of criminally deviant behavior
> by multiple Swedish women simultaneously, then un-suspected, then
> arrested in absentia, then re-suspected, and so on.
> 
> 6. Quietly continue developing secure software and services and be
> subject to selective prosecution according to how the political winds
> blow in the future.
> 
> Welcome back to the bad-old-days.
> 
> Except this time, it's cloud-based services, too.
> 
> - Marsh
> _______________________________________________
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> cryptography at randombit.net
> http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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