[cryptography] How are expired code-signing certs revoked?

Peter Gutmann pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz
Wed Dec 7 22:20:38 EST 2011

Marsh Ray <marsh at extendedsubset.com> writes:

>Apple's iPhone app store code signing is far more effective for example.

The effectiveness of that isn't the PKI or the signing though, it's that Apple
vets the apps before allowing them in the store.  You don't need certs, all you 
need to do is have Apple sign the apps with a key that's burned into the 
iPhone.  PKI in this case just gets in the way.  Heck, you don't even need 
signatures, just have the iPhone contact Apple and say "I just got fed 
something with this hash, is it OK?".

(Due to a confusion over certs, you couldn't until recently even verify the
signatures yourself because Apple published a different cert on their web site
than the one they used for signatures.  But in any case any use of PKI, and
possibly even signatures, in this case is just unnecessary complexity).


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