[cryptography] Password non-similarity?

ianG iang at iang.org
Wed Dec 28 03:02:18 EST 2011

On 28/12/11 09:48 AM, Solar Designer wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 03:54:35PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
>> We're bouncing around ways to enforce non-similarity in passwords over
>> time: password1 is too similar too password2 (and similar to
>> password3, etc).
>> I'm not sure its possible with one way functions and block cipher residues.
>> Has anyone ever implemented a system to enforce non-similarity business rules?

No.  It seems to be solving the wrong problem.

> Password histories are controversial.  They do not obviously improve
> security; they may as well make things a lot worse (even if you're just
> storing hashes).

Yeah.  Scratch an itch, add a risk.  http://xkcd.com/936/

I would suggest if you want to do put a filter in place, then give users 
a working practice for dealing with the change of passwords.

E.g., 1. write the password down in a known safe place.  2.  use 
ephemeral words that relate to the moment, like name of today's 
appointment.  3. share your password with at least one other person in 
your office.

The point being that they will anyway, might as well make it safer:

> ...  After the
> contest, they released John the Ripper rules that try to match users'
> typical approaches at bypassing password histories - appending the
> current year, month name, etc.  Apparently, this is what actually
> happens when there's a password history and regular password changes are
> enforced.

Sounds like a good final year student project, figure out what users do 
and create a tolerable practice for meeting them in the middle...


More information about the cryptography mailing list