[cryptography] preventing protocol failings

Peter Gutmann pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz
Wed Jul 13 10:11:47 EDT 2011

Andy Steingruebl <andy at steingruebl.com> writes:

>The way it for for everyone I knew that went through it was:
>1. Sniffing was sort of a problem, but most people didn't care
>2. Telnet was quite a bit of a pain, especially when using NAT, and wanting
>to do X11 forwarding
>3. Typing in your password again and again over telnet (which did have
>advantages over rlogin/rsh) was a pain.
>Enter SSH.  It solved #1, but the big boon to sysadmins to figure it out and
>installed it was that it *really* solved #2 and #3, hence major adoption.

Uhh, this seems like a somewhat unusual reinterpretation of history.  SSH was
primarily an encrypted telnet, and everything else was an optional add-on
(when it was first published it was almost rejected with the comment "this is
just another encrypted telnet").  The big boon to sysadmins was that (a) you
could now safely type in your root password without having to walk to the room
the box was in to sit at the console and (b) you could build and run it on
pretty much everything without any hassle or cost.  That combination was what
made it universal.


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