[cryptography] Non-governmental exploitation of crypto flaws?

Marsh Ray marsh at extendedsubset.com
Mon Nov 28 19:26:18 EST 2011


On 11/28/2011 05:58 PM, Marsh Ray wrote:
>
> I heard it stated somewhere that an Apple product was using PBKDF2
> with a work factor of 1. Does that count?

Follow-up.

It was Blackberry, not Apple:
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-3741

> Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2010-3741 Original release
> date:10/05/2010 Last revised:07/19/2011 Source: US-CERT/NIST
> Overview
>
> The offline backup mechanism in Research In Motion (RIM) BlackBerry
> Desktop Software uses single-iteration PBKDF2, which makes it easier
> for local users to decrypt a .ipd file via a brute-force attack.
> Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2010-3741 Original release
> date:10/05/2010 Last revised:07/19/2011 Source: US-CERT/NIST
> Overview
>
> The offline backup mechanism in Research In Motion (RIM) BlackBerry
> Desktop Software uses single-iteration PBKDF2, which makes it easier
> for local users to decrypt a .ipd file via a brute-force attack.

> http://www.infoworld.com/t/mobile-device-management/you-can-no-longer-rely-encryption-protect-blackberry-436
 > [Elcomsoft]
> In short, standard key-derivation function, PBKDF2, is used in a
> very strange way, to say the least. Where Apple has used 2,000
> iterations in iOS 3.x, and 10,000 iterations in iOS 4.x, BlackBerry
> uses only one.

Via http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2#BlackBerry_vulnerability .


- Marsh



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