[cryptography] Auditable CAs

ianG iang at iang.org
Wed Nov 30 13:23:01 EST 2011

On 28/11/11 08:00 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> Given the recent discussion on Sovereign Keys I thought people might
> be interested in a related, but less ambitious, idea Adam Langley and
> I have been kicking around:
> http://www.links.org/files/CertificateAuthorityTransparencyandAuditability.pdf.

I found this rather difficult to understand, it seemed bottom-up not 
top-down.  If one strips away the techno stuff, it seems to me to reduce 
to this:

1.  all valid certificates are to be published into a publically 
viewable reliable log.
2.  a subscriber has the responsibility of identifying improper 
certificates in that log.
3.  the existance of a certificate in the log is acceptable proof of 
goodness for a browser.

Is that it, in minimalist form?

In analogous terms, is this like having the browser check EFF's 
repository for a second opinion?  Or, like OCSP but expanding the 
servers to cover all certs from all CAs, and test on the certificates 
not the serial numbers?


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