[cryptography] SSL is not "broken by design"

Ben Laurie ben at links.org
Fri Sep 23 15:57:45 EDT 2011


On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 8:21 PM, ianG <iang at iang.org> wrote:
> On 24/09/11 05:13 AM, Jon Callas wrote:
>>
>> On Sep 23, 2011, at 11:17 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 4:46 PM, Peter Gutmann
>>> <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Ben Laurie<ben at links.org>  writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Well, don't tease. How?
>>>>
>>>> The link I've posted before (but didn't want to keep spamming to the
>>>> list):
>>>>
>>>> http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/pki_risk.pdf
>>>
>>> That was a fun read and I mostly agree, but it raises some questions...
>>>
>>> a) Key continuity is nice, but ... are you swapping one set of
>>> problems for another? What happens when I lose my key? How do I roll
>>> my key? I just added a second server with a different key, and now a
>>> bunch of users have the "wrong" key - what do I do? How do I deal with
>>> a compromised key?
>>
>> Great rhetorical questions, Ben. You nail it.
>>
>> Continuity is great, but it has its own set of problems that include all
>> the ones you mention. Rolling keys is the easiest one of them and can be
>> solved pretty much the same way. But all the others are problems that
>> continuity introduces. I brought up these issues in my long rant. Continuity
>> can solve some, but not all of the problems.
>
> Think of it as CA-signed+key-continuity.  Not either/or, but both,
> integrated, melded.

I'm thinking of it, and I don't get it.

The answer to all these questions seems to be "enroll with a CA". How
did that help?



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