[cryptography] Intel RNG

coderman coderman at gmail.com
Tue Jun 19 22:35:03 EDT 2012

On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 1:54 PM, Marsh Ray <marsh at extendedsubset.com> wrote:
> ... Just a sanity check that the output is
> actually changing once in a while would go a long way towards
> eliminating the most common failure modes.

On Tue, Jun 19, 2012 at 6:58 PM,  <dj at deadhat.com> wrote:
> ... Actually having a perfect source is a problem. It's much easier to
> test for a source with known defects that meet a well defined statistical
> model.

is there any literature on the typical failure modes of TRNG/entropy
sources in deployed systems?

my understanding is that they tend to fail catastrophically, in a way
easily detected by FIPS sanity checks. E.g. clearly broken.

is it exceedingly rare for subtle / increasing bias to occur due to
hardware failure or misuse in most designs? are there designs which
fail hard rather than fail silent when error is encountered?

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