[cryptography] cryptography Digest, Vol 25, Issue 2

=?windows-874?B?vsPgvuetIMrYx8PDs8rYog==?= npnunglovely at hotmail.co.th
Thu Mar 1 21:39:23 EST 2012


> From: cryptography-request at randombit.net
> Subject: cryptography Digest, Vol 25, Issue 2
> To: cryptography at randombit.net
> Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 17:04:14 -0500
> 
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> Today's Topics:
> 
>    1. Re: Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds Decrypt	Laptop
>       (Jeffrey Walton)
>    2. Certificate Transparency: working code (Ben Laurie)
>    3. Re: Certificate Transparency: working code (Thierry Moreau)
>    4. Re: Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds	Decrypt	Laptop
>       (Randall Webmail)
>    5. Re: Certificate Transparency: working code (Nico Williams)
>    6. Re: Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds Decrypt	Laptop
>       (Nico Williams)
>    7. Re: Certificate Transparency: working code (James A. Donald)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 12:02:32 -0500
> From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com>
> To: "James S. Tyre" <jstyre at jstyre.com>
> Cc: cryptography at randombit.net
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds
> 	Decrypt	Laptop
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAH8yC8kc9UffaYx3N5YTbGVcmMgwkPLnDSF3vbJ39TEpwzx0rg at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> On Wed, Feb 29, 2012 at 5:53 PM, James S. Tyre <jstyre at jstyre.com> wrote:
> > (This is the case in Colorado, not the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals case which has been
> > much discussed of late.)
> >
> > http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/02/decryption-flap-mooted
> >
> > Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds Decrypt Laptop
> >
> > ? ?By David Kravets
> > ? ?Email Author
> > ? ?February 29, 2012 |
> > ? ?5:17 pm
> >
> > Colorado federal authorities have decrypted a laptop seized from a bank-fraud defendant,
> > mooting a judge's order that the defendant unlock the hard drive so the government could
> > use its contents as evidence against her.
> >
> > The development ends a contentious legal showdown over whether forcing a defendant to
> > decrypt a laptop is a breach of the 5th Amendment right against compelled self
> > incrimination.
> >
> > The authorities seized the encrypted Toshiba laptop from defendant Ramona Fricosu in 2010
> > with valid court warrants while investigating alleged mortgage fraud, and demanded she
> > decrypt it. Colorado U.S. District Judge Robert Blackburn ordered the woman in January to
> > decrypt the laptop by the end of February. The judge refused to stay his decision to allow
> > Fricosu time to appeal.
> >
> > "They must have used or found successful one of the passwords the co-defendant provided
> > them," Fricosu's attorney, Philip Dubois, said in a telephone interview Wednesday.
> Perhaps Fricosu reused a password and was on a mailing list using Mailman...
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 19:17:51 +0000
> From: Ben Laurie <ben at links.org>
> To: Crypto discussion list <cryptography at randombit.net>
> Subject: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAG5KPzz__reNbN2BYqOB7WmqTmEDQdN8Y_axwPiFCcWM3k2eJQ at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"
> 
> http://www.links.org/?p=1226
> 
> "Certificate Transparency: Spec and Working Code<http://www.links.org/?p=1226>
> 
> Quite a few people have said to me that Certificate Transparency (CT)
> sounds like a good idea, but they?d like to see a proper spec.
> 
> Well, there?s been one of those for quite a while, you can find the latest
> version in the code
> repository<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/source/browse/doc/sunlight.xml>,
> or for your viewing convenience, I just made an HTML
> version<http://www.links.org/files/sunlight.html>
> .
> 
> Today, though, to go with that spec, I?m happy to announce working
> code<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/> for
> a subset of the protocol. This covers the trickiest part ? a fully
> backwards compatible SSL handshake between servers and clients. The rest of
> the protocol will necessarily all be new code for interacting with the log
> server and other new components, and so should not have these issues.
> 
> If you build the code according to the
> README<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/source/browse/src/README>,
> then you will find instructions in
> test/README<http://code.google.com/p/certificate-transparency/source/browse/src/test/README>
> for
> the demo.
> 
> What this does, in short, is the following:
> 
>    - Run a CT log server. Currently this has no persistence across runs,
>    but does keep a full log in memory.
>    - Issue a self-signed server certificate. A CA issued certificate would
>    also be fine, but not so easy to automate for a demo.
>    - Use the CT client to register that certificate with the log server and
>    to obtain a log proof for it.
>    - Use the CT client to convert that proof into a fake ?certificate?
>    which can be included in the certificate chain in the TLS handshake.
>    - Run an Apache 2.2 instance to serve the self-signed certificate and
>    the log proof certificate. Note that Apache is unmodified, all that is
>    needed is appropriate configuration.
>    - Use the CT client to connect to the Apache instance and verify the
>    presented log proof.
>    - You can also connect to Apache with an existing browser to check that
>    you can still access the site despite the presence of the log proof.
> 
> There?s plenty more to be done, but this is the part that needs the
> earliest scrutiny, since we are bending the rules to get back compatibility
> and avoid the need to change server software. Client software has to change
> anyway to provide any benefit to users, so that?s less of a worry.
> 
> We welcome discussion, suggestions and questions on the mailing
> list<https://groups.google.com/group/certificate-transparency>
> ."
> -------------- next part --------------
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> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 3
> Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2012 16:14:27 -0500
> From: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau at connotech.com>
> To: Ben Laurie <ben at links.org>
> Cc: Crypto discussion list <cryptography at randombit.net>
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code
> Message-ID: <4F4FE6B3.5030002 at connotech.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
> 
> Ben Laurie wrote:
> > http://www.links.org/?p=1226
> > 
> > Quite a few people have said to me that Certificate Transparency (CT) 
> > sounds like a good idea, but they?d like to see a proper spec.
> > 
> > Well, there?s been one of those for quite a while, you can find the 
> > latest version [...],
> > or for your viewing convenience, I just made an HTML version 
> > <http://www.links.org/files/sunlight.html>.
> > 
> 
> May I ask a (maybe stupid) question?
> 
> "... audit proofs will be valid indefinitely ..."
> 
> Then what remains of the scheme reputation once Mallory managed to 
> inject a fraudulent certificate in whatever is being audited (It's 
> called a "log" but I understand it as a grow-only repository)?
> 
> Actually, my expectation would be to read an explanation of which 
> security services are being offered, and which kind and level of 
> assurance the CT server operating organization is expected to provide. 
> What is the problem being addressed and to who does the main benefit 
> accrue / from whom involvement is expected? Once I can see these, I may 
> appreciate Apache and browser backward compatibility features and the like.
> 
> Thanks for your patience with my scrutiny.
> 
> 
> -- 
> - Thierry Moreau
> 
> CONNOTECH Experts-conseils inc.
> 9130 Place de Montgolfier
> Montreal, QC, Canada H2M 2A1
> 
> Tel. +1-514-385-5691
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 4
> Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 16:22:22 -0500 (EST)
> From: Randall  Webmail <rvh40 at insightbb.com>
> To: Crypto List <cryptography at randombit.net>
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds
> 	Decrypt	Laptop
> Message-ID:
> 	<983652243.1774287.1330636942100.JavaMail.root at md03.insight.synacor.com>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
> 
> From: "Jeffrey Walton" <noloader at gmail.com>
> 
> >> "They must have used or found successful one of the passwords the co-defendant provided
> >> them," Fricosu's attorney, Philip Dubois, said in a telephone interview Wednesday.
> 
> >Perhaps Fricosu reused a password and was on a mailing list using Mailman...
> 
> Yeah - what's the deal with Mailman sending the password in clear-text, once a month?  
> 
> Did anyone really think that was a good idea?  Was it a tradeoff between security and help desk support costs?   What other reason could there be?
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 5
> Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 15:26:31 -0600
> From: Nico Williams <nico at cryptonector.com>
> To: Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau at connotech.com>
> Cc: Crypto discussion list <cryptography at randombit.net>
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAK3OfOjsZuSkwBHJG2GGwuLs689V=gCD9ZbS06ygZYXtgGij5g at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 3:14 PM, Thierry Moreau
> <thierry.moreau at connotech.com> wrote:
> > May I ask a (maybe stupid) question?
> >
> > "... audit proofs will be valid indefinitely ..."
> >
> > Then what remains of the scheme reputation once Mallory managed to inject a
> > fraudulent certificate in whatever is being audited (It's called a "log" but
> > I understand it as a grow-only repository)?
> 
> IIUC...
> 
> Someone (domain owners) has to audit the CAs by reviewing their audit
> logs.  If enough domain owners do this then the remaining domain
> owners' clients get protection by the deterrent effect of having CAs
> be auditable and mostly-audited too -- something not too unlike herd
> immunity.
> 
> Security with CT is asynchronous as far as the client is concerned,
> but with some help from CAs this could be made as good as synchronous.
>  The client synchronously gets a proof that the server cert has been
> added to the log.  The client could even get synchronous confirmation
> that the logs have been audited by the target server's owners up to a
> given point in time -- hopefully very recently.  There will be some
> latency from "a cert gets added to the log" to "that addition was
> audited", but if auditable CAs commit to issuing certificates with
> notBefore set in the future by enough time that most domain owners can
> have audited the issuance and revoked it if necessary *before* the new
> cert becomes valid, then the client gets as good as synchronous
> protection.
> 
> I think the audit-by-domain-owners latency could be made as short as
> seconds, but hours will do.
> 
> Nico
> --
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 6
> Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2012 15:33:12 -0600
> From: Nico Williams <nico at cryptonector.com>
> To: Randall Webmail <rvh40 at insightbb.com>
> Cc: Crypto List <cryptography at randombit.net>
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] Constitutional Showdown Voided as Feds
> 	Decrypt	Laptop
> Message-ID:
> 	<CAK3OfOhff9r_FEBYw+RrCbNtEZtpxMijVm_=PbYtj_DqKiZDMg at mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
> 
> On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 3:22 PM, Randall  Webmail <rvh40 at insightbb.com> wrote:
> > From: "Jeffrey Walton" <noloader at gmail.com>
> >>Perhaps Fricosu reused a password and was on a mailing list using Mailman...
> >
> > Yeah - what's the deal with Mailman sending the password in clear-text, once a month?
> >
> > Did anyone really think that was a good idea? ?Was it a tradeoff between security and help desk support costs? ? What other reason could there be?
> 
> Mailman passwords are of very low value.
> 
> Nico
> --
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 7
> Date: Fri, 02 Mar 2012 08:01:05 +1000
> From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd at echeque.com>
> To: cryptography at randombit.net
> Subject: Re: [cryptography] Certificate Transparency: working code
> Message-ID: <4F4FF1A1.4090203 at echeque.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
> 
> On 2012-03-02 7:14 AM, Thierry Moreau wrote:
> > Then what remains of the scheme reputation once Mallory managed to
> > inject a fraudulent certificate in whatever is being audited (It's
> > called a "log" but I understand it as a grow-only repository)?
> 
> Suppose an Iranian CA were to issue certificate for a US site.  The US 
> site would readily discover it, causing such grave embarrassment for the 
> Iranian CA that they would probably refrain.
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
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> 
> End of cryptography Digest, Vol 25, Issue 2
> *******************************************
 		 	   		  
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