[cryptography] Paypal phish using EV certificate
noloader at gmail.com
Tue Aug 13 05:25:18 EDT 2013
On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 5:10 AM, Peter Gutmann
<pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
> I recently got a another of the standard phishing emails for Paypal, directing
> me to https://email-edg.paypal.com, which redirects to
> https://view.paypal-communication.com, which has a PayPal EV certificate from
> Verisign. According to this post
> http://www.onelogin.com/a-paypal-phishing-attack/ it may or may not be a
> phishing attack (no-one's really sure), and this post
> http://www.linuxevolution.net/?p=12 says it is a phishing attack and the site
> will be shut down by Paypal... back in May 2011.
> Can anyone explain this? It's either a really clever phish (or the CAs are
> following their historically lax levels of checking), or Paypal has joined the
> ranks of US banks in training their users to become phishing victims.
If that's true, I think the more interesting fact is: it appears
email-edg.paypal.com is controlled by the attacker. Why else would
Paypal redirect from a host in their domain to a host not in their
domain controlled by the adversary? (Its a bit different than standard
phishing training where both hosts/domains are controlled by Paypal).
Has Paypal fess'ed up to any break-ins or breaches?
More information about the cryptography