[cryptography] Reply to Zooko (in Markdown)

Jon Callas jon at callas.org
Sat Aug 17 13:50:42 EDT 2013

On Aug 17, 2013, at 12:49 AM, Bryan Bishop <kanzure at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 1:04 AM, Jon Callas <jon at callas.org> wrote:
> It's very hard, even with controlled releases, to get an exact byte-for-byte recompile of an app. Some compilers make this impossible because they randomize the branch prediction and other parts of code generation. Even when the compiler isn't making it literally impossible, without an exact copy of the exact tool chain with the same linkers, libraries, and system, the code won't be byte-for-byte the same. Worst of all, smart development shops use the *oldest* possible tool chain, not the newest one because tool sets are designed for forwards-compatibility (apps built with old tools run on the newest OS) rather than backwards-compatibility (apps built with the new tools run on older OSes). Code reliability almost requires using tool chains that are trailing-edge.
> Would providing (signed) build vm images solve the problem of distributing your toolchain?

Maybe. The obvious counterexample is a compiler that doesn't deterministically generate code, but there's lots and lots of hair in there, including potential problems in distributing the tool chain itself, including copyrighted tools, libraries, etc.

But let's not rathole on that, and get to brass tacks.

I *cannot* provide an argument of security that can be verified on its own. This is Godel's second incompleteness theorem. A set of statements S cannot be proved consistent on its own. (Yes, that's a minor handwave.)

All is not lost, however. We can say, "Meh, good enough" and the problem is solved. Someone else can construct a *verifier* that is some set of policies (I'm using the word "policy" but it could be a program) that verifies the software. However, the verifier can only be verified by a set of policies that are constructed to verify it. The only escape is decide at some point, "meh, good enough."

I brought Ken Thompson into it because he actually constructed a rootkit that would evade detection and described it in his Turing Award lecture. It's not *just* philosophy and theoretical computer science. Thompson flat-out says, that at some point you have to trust the people who wrote the software, because if they want to hide things in the code, they can.

I hope I don't sound like a broken record, but a smart attacker isn't going to attack there, anyway. A smart attacker doesn't break crypto, or suborn releases. They do traffic analysis and make custom malware. Really. Go look at what Snowden is telling us. That is precisely what all the bad guys are doing. Verification is important, but that's not where the attacks come from (ignoring the notable exceptions, of course).

One of my tasks is to get better source releases out there. However, I also have to prioritize it with other tasks, including actual software improvements. We're working on a release that will tie together some new anti-surveillance code along with a better source release. We're testing the new source release process with some people not in our organization, as well. It will get better; it *is* getting better.


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20130817/12b9e4ee/attachment-0001.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: PGP.sig
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 197 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.randombit.net/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20130817/12b9e4ee/attachment-0001.sig>

More information about the cryptography mailing list