[cryptography] Reply to Zooko (in Markdown)

Warren Kumari warren at kumari.net
Fri Aug 23 12:35:55 EDT 2013

On Aug 23, 2013, at 12:19 PM, Nicolas Rachinsky <crypto-rand-0 at ml.turing-complete.org> wrote:

> * Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko at leastauthority.com> [2013-08-23 15:21 +0000]:
>> But before we get into the nuts and bolts of how to facilitate
>> verification of end-to-end security, I want to hammer on the first
>> issue: before going forth to try to improve an issue, we should first
>> admit to our current customers and to the public that the issue
>> exists. We shouldn't mislead our customers into thinking that they are
>> safe from something that they are not. Silent Circle's closure of
>> Silent Mail for the stated reason is inconsistent with its continued
>> operation of the Silent Text service. The stated reason was that the
>> US federal government could compel Silent Circle to backdoor the
>> Silent Mail service. That same reason applies today to the Silent Text
>> service and the other services that Silent Circle is still operating.
> What if there was a secret court order for the services (excluding
> Silent Mail)? And the one requesting the secret court order learned
> from the Lavabit shutdown and so the secret court order required
> them to keep the services running?

Whoo, I've just had a brilliant idea. 

It looks bad for the economy when a company shuts down -- so, the obvious solution is to simply slap failing companies with secret court orders to stay in business, making hamburgers or whatever.

You could extend this to all sorts of things, like convincing the government that some service that your competitor offers, but that you know is hemorrhaging $$$ is vital to national security, thereby forcing them to continue offering it…

Ta, I'm off to go write a business plan,

> Nicolas
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