[cryptography] DNSNMC replaces Certificate Authorities with Namecoin and fixes HTTPS security
marcus.brinkmann at ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Sun Dec 22 04:44:53 EST 2013
On 12/21/2013 10:04 PM, Eduardo Robles Elvira wrote:
> The obvious problem with this is that namecoin doesn't have all the
> domain names already registered assigned to the current owners, and
> there's no arbitration authority that can prevent domain cibersquatting.
This is not a weakness of namecoin, but a weakness of human readable names.
Why does coke.ch lead to the website of the Coca Cola Company, and not
an informational website on heroin addiction? Because someone at that
company decided to "cibersquat" this domain.
> So I can register all the important domains: microsoft, ebay, google,
> nsa, whitehouse,
They are only important if you value e-commerce, advertising and the US
institutions more than the alternatives that could exist.
The solution to this is that names should not claimed, they should be
given by the community that values the association. Neither DNS nor
namecoin allows for that, so both are inadequate. As an example,
consider how Wikipedia pages are named: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coke
This is painfully obvious, and yet we are mentally stuck in an
authoritative model of naming. If the use of words (in spoken language)
were assigned like this, we would hate it.
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