[cryptography] DNSNMC replaces Certificate Authorities with Namecoin and fixes HTTPS security

Natanael natanael.l at gmail.com
Sun Dec 22 07:41:43 EST 2013

That sounds a lot like my Web of Trust based DNS suggestion. Link:


Domain names would not be globally unique, where they go would instead be
based on each individual node's trust ranking for the site's node and for
the nodes that has signed a "vote" for that domain name association.
Communities could set a high level of trust to the same set of trusted
people to make sure domain names used within the community goes to the same
place for all the members.

- Sent from my phone
Den 22 dec 2013 10:45 skrev "Marcus Brinkmann" <
marcus.brinkmann at ruhr-uni-bochum.de>:

> On 12/21/2013 10:04 PM, Eduardo Robles Elvira wrote:
>> The obvious problem with this is that namecoin doesn't have all the
>> domain names already registered assigned to the current owners, and
>> there's no arbitration authority that can prevent domain cibersquatting.
> This is not a weakness of namecoin, but a weakness of human readable names.
> Why does coke.ch lead to the website of the Coca Cola Company, and not an
> informational website on heroin addiction?  Because someone at that company
> decided to "cibersquat" this domain.
>  So I can register all the important domains: microsoft, ebay, google,
>> nsa, whitehouse,
> They are only important if you value e-commerce, advertising and the US
> institutions more than the alternatives that could exist.
> The solution to this is that names should not claimed, they should be
> given by the community that values the association.  Neither DNS nor
> namecoin allows for that, so both are inadequate.  As an example, consider
> how Wikipedia pages are named: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coke
> This is painfully obvious, and yet we are mentally stuck in an
> authoritative model of naming.  If the use of words (in spoken language)
> were assigned like this, we would hate it.
> Thanks,
> Marcus
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