[cryptography] DNSNMC replaces Certificate Authorities with Namecoin and fixes HTTPS security

Kelly John Rose iam at kjro.se
Sun Dec 22 18:04:38 EST 2013

Now there is an interesting idea. And we can refer to them as top level
domains. Perhaps since people tend to gayer geographically we can make them
geographically related. Say ca for Canada and de for Germany.

Oh wait.

On Sunday, December 22, 2013, Marcus Brinkmann wrote:

> On 12/22/2013 12:58 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
>> On 2013-12-22 19:44, Marcus Brinkmann wrote:
>>> The solution to this is that names should not claimed, they should be
>>> given by the community that values the association.  Neither DNS nor
>>> namecoin allows for that, so both are inadequate.  As an example,
>>> consider how Wikipedia pages are named: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
>>> Coke
>> Wikipedia does a pretty good job on naming.  The names of Wikepedia
>> articles are not politicized, but its articles are severely politicized,
>> because they rely on Academia and the New York Times as final authority,
>> and Academia and the New York Times is politicized.
> I agree, but who said there can only be one directory for names?  If
> social groups disagree, they should each manage their own directory,
> With the right tools, we could stack directories.  Most people will prefer
> the mainstream "bourgeoisie" naming directory, while many might choose to
> layer smaller special-interest directories on top of that. Extremist will
> maintain their own exclusive directories untainted by mainstream naming.
> And while you are at it, you can throw adblock in the mix, because
> manipulating DNS names (to point to /dev/null) is one of its tasks.
>  If it was naming keys, so that various entities wanted each wanted their
>> own key given a certain popular name, naming keys would also be
>> politicized.
>> Yes, we should have some social procedure for naming names, so that the
>> the major influence is what other people call the key, rather than what
>> the owner of the key wants to key to be called, but any such procedure
>> will come under attack.
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Kelly John Rose
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