[cryptography] another cert failure

Jeffrey Walton noloader at gmail.com
Sat Jan 5 16:23:42 EST 2013

On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 3:59 PM, Ryan Hurst <ryan.hurst at globalsign.com> wrote:
> I've been unable to find a screenshot but this FAQ does suggest that there
> is an explicit action required to enable HTTPS inspection:
> https://supportcenter.checkpoint.com/supportcenter/portal?eventSubmit_doGoviewsolutiondetails=&solutionid=sk65123
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lJBBRsc03A, time: 2:45.

Its now clear it was willful.

> As for what appropriate consequences are for TurkTrust; so far my position
> would be that TurkTrust appears to have acted responsibly once they became
> aware of the issue and it seems their action was not malicious or
> representative of a systematic failure.
> If these two things are true and heavy-handed punishment is levied it would
> send the message to other actors in this ecosystem that responding openly
> and responsibly would likely result in the same punishment.
In the future, we won't need their honesty. Or the 'honesty' they want
use to perceive.

There are over 650 roots and subordinate (is that still the case for
Mozilla?), and we won't miss them.

Continuing Mozilla's precedent is a bad idea. Mozilla was too ignorant
or stupid to realize they were not dealing with a 'reasonable person'
(license here in corporate 'personhood'). Corporations are the
equivalent of psychopaths. A corporation needs to be held responsible
and accountable. (A good documentary, if interested:

I wonder how many other CAs confessed to Mozilla back when Trustwave
did. Probably 0. That's what I would have advised if I were one of the
corporate lawyers - you never admit to anything.

Did anyone really think a CA would risk a multimillion dollar business?

> As such I would think It appropriate to consider this situation and it's
> facts separately.
The end result will be the industry just got reinforcement that bad
behavior is OK. I really don't see how its going to get any
better..... (sans some initiatives like the SSL observatory).


> On Jan 5, 2013, at 12:44 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Ryan Hurst <ryan.hurst at globalsign.com>
> wrote:
> Ian, I do agree with you that the dynamic configurations of them firewall is
> the most suspect part of the story.
> I'm inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt based on my experience
> managing some UI related efforts inside of Windows -- aka today modern
> software makes an effort to intuit user intent based off of action.
> I think we need a screen shot of the UI in question. I have not
> managed a Checkpoint firewall in years, but I have my suspicions. That
> might offer something fairly conclusive about the willfulness of the
> end customer.
> TurkTrust likely sold the certificates in pursuit of profits. I don't
> think there's any doubt about that. Are they not responsible for their
> actions (even if it was a mistake in hindsight)?
> OT: what are folks going to do when a data breach occurs in someone
> else's cloud provider and your PII/SSN goes flying out the window.
> Worse, bury it in layers of corporate indirection so its nearly
> impossible to be made whole. Are folks going to give those negligent
> the benefit of the doubt and say its OK?

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