[cryptography] Why anon-DH is less damaging than current browser PKI (a rant in five paragraphs)
James A. Donald
jamesd at echeque.com
Sun Jan 6 19:35:00 EST 2013
On 2013-01-07 9:20 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> I'll update it as soon as browser PKI starts working (meaning that we have
> real evidence that it's effectively preventing the sorts of things attackers
> are doing, phishing and so on). Deal?
The fundamental cause of phishing is that it is so easy to present a
false email identity.
A phisher is typically representing himself as an entity with which you
have a login relationship.
To protect against login phishing, we need to both provide
password-authenticated key agreement
also provide some method whereby entities that have a login relationship
with you can communicate, and get automatically protected from spam
filtering and flagged as coming from an entity where you have a login
relationship - for example, whenever you logged in, your email client
would get information associating a public key with that login
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