[cryptography] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-05.txt> (Certificate Transparency) to Experimental RFC

Stephen Farrell stephen.farrell at cs.tcd.ie
Tue Jan 8 11:08:26 EST 2013

There's been a bit of discussion about CT on this list
in the last few days.

If you've comments on CT then they'd be timely now, since
we're running an IETF last call on the draft (ends on Jan
24) with a view to pushing it out as an experimental track


PS: If you want to comment but aren't sure how, mail me

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Last Call: <draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-05.txt> (Certificate
Transparency) to Experimental RFC
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2012 11:33:58 -0800
From: The IESG <iesg-secretary at ietf.org>
Reply-To: ietf at ietf.org
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce at ietf.org>

The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
the following document:
- 'Certificate Transparency'
  <draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-05.txt> as Experimental RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf at ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-01-24. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg at ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.


   The aim of Certificate Transparency is to have every public end-
   entity (for example, web servers) and intermediate TLS certificate
   issued by a known Certificate Authority recorded in one or more
   certificate logs.  In order to detect misissuance of certificates,
   all logs are publicly auditable.  In particular, domain owners or
   their agents will be able to monitor logs for certificates issued on
   their own domain.

   To protect clients from unlogged misissued certificates, each log
   signs all certificates it records, and clients can choose not to
   trust certificates that are not accompanied by an appropriate log
   signature.  For privacy and performance reasons log signatures are
   embedded in the TLS handshake via the TLS authorization extension, in
   a stapled OCSP extension, or in the certificate itself via an X.509v3
   certificate extension.

   To ensure a globally consistent view of any particular log, each log
   also provides a global signature over the entire log.  Any
   inconsistency of logs can be detected through cross-checks on the
   global signature.  Consistency between any pair of global signatures,
   corresponding to snapshots of a particular log at different times,
   can be efficiently shown.

   Logs are only expected to certify that they have seen a certificate,
   and thus we do not specify any revocation mechanism for log
   signatures in this document.  Logs are append-only, and log
   signatures do not expire.

The file can be obtained via

IESG discussion can be tracked via

More information about the cryptography mailing list