[cryptography] yet another certificate MITM attack

Krassimir Tzvetanov maillists at krassi.biz
Thu Jan 10 18:25:22 EST 2013


Good point. My thinking is:

First how do you know it's Nokia that really posted this?

Second read the post carefully. They are not admitting to anything.
There is an implied - "if we needed to it would be secure" or
something along those lines which means exactly nothing. this second
thing makes me think it's really Nokia throwing dust in their face in
a nice way since it's a difficult to explian this stuff to people of
the clueless-new level demonstrated on the forum.

Btw. there is a Bulgarian proverb that states (don't read if you are
easily offend-able):  If somebody says your sister is a whore, go
prove you don't even have a sister. Thus Nokia stated that if they
were to have a sister she would be seeing the doctor regularly and be
clean.

Best,
Krassi

On Thu, Jan 10, 2013 at 3:17 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 10, 2013 at 6:02 PM, Krassimir Tzvetanov
> <maillists at krassi.biz> wrote:
>> What the wireshark captures are showing is the OVI app talking to
>> their cloud (I would speculate the app is just updating its catalog or
>> something of that sort).
>>
>> I did not see even a mention of the word fingerprint. Let alone
>> comparing the "fake" with the "real".  Do I need to continue :)
>
> From Ian's initial post (below). It begs the question, why would Nokia
> even comment or admit to tampering with the secure channel?
>
>>>> Which Nokia apparently admits:
>>>>
>>>> "When temporary decryption of HTTPS connections is required on our proxy
>>>> servers, to transform and deliver users’ content, it is done in a secure
>>>> manner."
>>>>
>>>> http://gaurangkp.wordpress.com/2013/01/09/nokia-https-mitm/
>
> Not that it matters to folks like Mozilla.....
>
> Jeff
>
>> On Thu, Jan 10, 2013 at 2:21 PM, Jeffrey Altman
>> <jaltman at secure-endpoints.com> wrote:
>>> When you look at what the Nokia Browser does in the non-TLS case you see
>>> that the Nokia Browser like the Kindle Browser and Opera Mobile use a
>>> dedicated proxy server to avoid DNS latency and permit
>>> cached/compressed/reformatted web pages to be transmitted to the mobile
>>> device.  This is
>>> performed by the Nokia Browser including the desired target URL as a
>>> private http header.
>>>
>>> What I believe is occurring for https connections is that Nokia Browser
>>> is establishing a TLS connection to the Nokia Proxy and continuing to
>>> send the target URL as a private http header.   What is unclear is how
>>> the Nokia Browser interacts with the proxy under this situation.  Is the
>>> Proxy providing a tunnel for the client or is it acting as a MITM?
>>>
>>> This does not appear to me to be a certificate being misused.
>>>
>>> Jeffrey Altman
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/10/2013 4:53 PM, ianG wrote:
>>>
>>>> Just on that theme of multiple attacks from different vectors leading to
>>>> questions at the systemic level, another certificate failure just got
>>>> posted on slashdot:
>>>>
>>>> http://mobile.slashdot.org/story/13/01/09/1910210/nokia-redirecting-traffic-on-some-of-its-phones-including
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "On Wednesday, security professional Gaurang Pandya outlined how Nokia
>>>> is hijacking Internet browsing traffic on some of its phones. As a
>>>> result, the company technically has access to all your Internet content,
>>>> including sensitive data that is sent over secure connections (HTTPS),
>>>> such as banking credentials and pretty much any other usernames and
>>>> passwords you use to login to services on the Internet. Last month,
>>>> Pandya noted his Nokia phone (an Asha 302) was forcing traffic through a
>>>> proxy, instead of directly hitting the requested server. The connections
>>>> are either redirected to Nokia/Ovi proxy servers if the Nokia browser is
>>>> used, and to Opera proxy servers if the Opera Mini browser is used (both
>>>> apps use the same User-Agent)."
>>>>
>>>> Which Nokia apparently admits:
>>>>
>>>> "When temporary decryption of HTTPS connections is required on our proxy
>>>> servers, to transform and deliver users’ content, it is done in a secure
>>>> manner."
>>>>
>>>> http://gaurangkp.wordpress.com/2013/01/09/nokia-https-mitm/
>>>>
>>>> Pictures above seem to indicate VeriSign as the CA, but whether that
>>>> means they know about the MITMing is not clear.



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