[cryptography] phishing/password end-game (Re: Why anon-DH ...)
iang at iang.org
Fri Jan 18 11:14:56 EST 2013
On 17/01/13 05:21 AM, dan at geer.org wrote:
> > To clarify: I think everyone and everything should be identified by
> > their public key,...
> Would re-analyzing all this in a key-centric model rather than
> a name-centric model offer any insight? (key-centric meaning
> that the key is the identity and "Dan" is an attribute of that
> key; name-centric meaning that Dan is the identity and the key
> is an attribute of that name)
Key-centric works up until a point. It is certainly more elegant and
more secure in technical terms, but some assumptions tend to need to be
handwaved away to make it workable.
Primarily, storing the key and protecting it seems to result in the same
old mess -- it has to be stored somewhere safe and kept safe. Which
tends to imply ... name and password.
Now, with mobile phones, things have got a lot better in that respect.
Cells (as this audience likely calls them) are small, powerful and most
importantly with their owners all the time. They can certainly store
keys and keep them safe, in principle.
But things have also got a lot worse in other respects. The security
model on phones seems to lack, and as attention mounts, we seem not to
be seeing that iron-clad expectation that we'd desire. E.g., rumours of
Also, the confounded users tend to lose their phones or have them
stolen. And then they demand their 'identities' back, as if nothing has
happened. So the keys need to be agile, in some sense. Which pushes us
away from the phone, to cloud, or a variant, and then we're back to the
same old remote password problem.
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