[cryptography] Trustworthy Cloud Based Services (Was: phishing/password end-game)

Jeffrey Walton noloader at gmail.com
Fri Jan 18 15:53:24 EST 2013


Hi Warren,

> I guess I hadn't selected the sarcasm font when writing this...
My bad.

I'm very suspicious of the cloud, and the obscene terms of service
that accompany them. We have not done a good job of protecting our own
secrets, and I am doubtful of the benefits of adding another layer of
corporate indirection to the mix.

In the past, I had to recuse myself from a paper on
SmartGrid/Cloud/Security because I am so doubtful of the security
properties of Software as a Service, Platform as a Service, and
Infrastructure as a Service.

Recently, the Secure Coding List received a CFP (W2SP 2013 - Web 2.0
Security and Privacy workshop) which included the topic of
"Trustworthy Cloud Based Services". I suggested an analysis of Terms
of Service to see if any solution would even qualify (or more likely,
exclude themselves from a 'trustworthy cloud based solution' based on
their own ToS). I am genuinely interested in such an analysis.

Jeff

On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:40 PM, Warren Kumari <warren at kumari.net> wrote:
>
> On Jan 18, 2013, at 2:04 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Warren Kumari <warren at kumari.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Jan 18, 2013, at 11:14 AM, ianG <iang at iang.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 17/01/13 05:21 AM, dan at geer.org wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>...
>>>
>>> Sure, you can store them all in the "cloud" and protect them with… err… a username and password and then just download the ones you need and import them and…
>>> Oh, and this needs to be usable by the sort of folk who need help plugging in a USB cable…
>> Dangerous.
>>
>
> Oh, no doubt…
>
>> When the US government started its illegal wiretapping campaign, I
>> understand only one telecom resisted. Here, information was being
>> provided upon request and not by court order. Will any cloud providers
>> resist?
>
> Ah, I guess I was not clear -- the keys would be encrypted *with your password* somewhere -- "the cloud" was shorthand for "somewhere easily and universally reachable".
>
> They would only be decrypted on a local machine (like, you know, the untrusted kiosk!)
> Yes, this reduces the entire solution to a password ;-)
>
> I guess I hadn't selected the sarcasm font when writing this...
>
>>
>> Before someone gets upset, I've been in meetings where folks gasped
>> when I claimed we should model government as a threat.
>
> Well, duh… Isn't basically everything that is not yourself a threat?
>
>> When I asked if
>> its OK for the DoD or an Army analyst to read/analyze State Department
>> or Diplomatice Security Service traffic, the answer was NO. I took
>> that to mean they wanted privacy from all parties (including other
>> agencies), but did not know how to ask for it (and I did not frame it
>> properly).



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