[cryptography] Potential funding for crypto-related projects

James A. Donald jamesd at echeque.com
Wed Jul 3 18:47:00 EDT 2013


On 2013-07-04 2:11 AM, Wasabee wrote:
> On 03/07/2013 13:31, Michael Rogers wrote:
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> Hash: SHA1
>>
>> On 03/07/13 13:26, danimoth wrote:
>>> Not directly related to remailer, but what about dc nets [1] ?
>>>
>>> [1] The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
>>>      Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability (David Chaum)
>> DC nets have two major drawbacks: they don't scale, and any participant
>> can anonymously jam the channel. Dissent is a recent system that aims to
>> address both drawbacks:
>> https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi12/strong-scalable-anonymity-safetynet 
>>
>
> is it really feasible to get good latency/bandwith with such system? 
> it seems users need to transmit packets at the same time; so it seems 
> the latency and bandwidth is a bottleneck because everyone must wait 
> for the users with highest latency and lowest bandwidth? Or is there a 
> scheduling mechanism involved (which would "eat up" "usable" bandwidth)?
>
> Also, how much trust is put on servers compared to Tor? At first 
> sight, it seems that the compromise of one server will compromise all 
> clients connected to this server since servers knows all their shared 
> secret.

It suffices that one server is not controlled by your adversary, even if 
all the others are NSA plants, even if the server you are using is an 
NSA plant.

However, a single evil server can jam the channel, so have to identify 
and throw out actively disruptive servers.

Effectively, the servers form a DC net, and client anonymity is layered 
on top of that.


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