[cryptography] [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"
James A. Donald
jamesd at echeque.com
Sat Jul 13 03:34:24 EDT 2013
On 2013-07-13 3:43 PM, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 1:38 AM, William Yager <will.yager at gmail.com
> <mailto:will.yager at gmail.com>> wrote:
> not trusting your hardware is a great place to start.
> Heh, might as well just give up.
> (I know what you meant, just couldn't resist.)
> On Fri, Jul 12, 2013 at 7:20 PM, Peter Gutmann
> <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz <mailto:pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>> wrote:
> Nico Williams <nico at cryptonector.com
> <mailto:nico at cryptonector.com>> writes:
> >I'd like to understand what attacks NSA and friends could
> mount, with Intel's
> >witting or unwitting cooperation, particularly what attacks
> that *wouldn't*
> >put civilian (and military!) infrastructure at risk should
> details of a
> >backdoor leak to the public, or *worse*, be stolen by an
> Right. How exactly would you backdoor an RNG so (a) it could
> be effectively
> used by the NSA when they needed it (e.g. to recover Tor
> keys), (b) not affect
> the security of massive amounts of infrastructure, and (c) be
> so totally
> undetectable that there'd be no risk of it causing a s**tstorm
> that makes the
> $0.5B FDIV bug seem like small change
Arrange that a certain specific sequence of data operations, which can
be triggered by processing an incoming packet, switches the random
number generator from true random mode to pseudo random mode based on a
key found in that data.
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