[cryptography] [liberationtech] Heml.is - "The Beautiful & Secure Messenger"

James A. Donald jamesd at echeque.com
Sat Jul 13 03:34:24 EDT 2013

On 2013-07-13 3:43 PM, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 1:38 AM, William Yager <will.yager at gmail.com 
> <mailto:will.yager at gmail.com>> wrote:
>      not trusting your hardware is a great place to start.
> Heh, might as well just give up. 
> http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
> (I know what you meant, just couldn't resist.)
>     On Fri, Jul 12, 2013 at 7:20 PM, Peter Gutmann
>     <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz <mailto:pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz>> wrote:
>         Nico Williams <nico at cryptonector.com
>         <mailto:nico at cryptonector.com>> writes:
>         >I'd like to understand what attacks NSA and friends could
>         mount, with Intel's
>         >witting or unwitting cooperation, particularly what attacks
>         that *wouldn't*
>         >put civilian (and military!) infrastructure at risk should
>         details of a
>         >backdoor leak to the public, or *worse*, be stolen by an
>         antagonist.
>         Right.  How exactly would you backdoor an RNG so (a) it could
>         be effectively
>         used by the NSA when they needed it (e.g. to recover Tor
>         keys), (b) not affect
>         the security of massive amounts of infrastructure, and (c) be
>         so totally
>         undetectable that there'd be no risk of it causing a s**tstorm
>         that makes the
>         $0.5B FDIV bug seem like small change

Arrange that a certain specific sequence of data operations, which can 
be triggered by processing an incoming packet, switches the random 
number generator from true random mode to pseudo random mode based on a 
key found in that data.
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