[cryptography] Here's What Law Enforcement Can Recover From A Seized iPhone
noloader at gmail.com
Thu Mar 28 01:37:00 EDT 2013
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 11:37 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg <jeffrey at goldmark.org> wrote:
> On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:30 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com> wrote:
> I wonder how they are doing it when other tools fails.
> ... In the other cases, the phones did have a passcode lock, but
> with 10000 possible four digit codes it takes about 40 minutes to run
> through all given how Apple has calibrated PBKDF2 on these (4 trials per
Does rooting and Jailbreaking invalidate evidence collection? Do
hardware manufacturers and OS vendors have alternate methods? For
example, what if LE wanted/needed iOS 4's hardware key? I suspect
Apple has the methods/processes to provide it.
I think there's much more to it than a simple brute force.
> I've been recommending that people turn off "simple passcode" on iOS devices
> and move to at least six digits. If your non-simple passcode is all digits,
> you are still get the numeric keypad.
Yes good advice. The platform's data protection on hardware encryption
keys is a good start.
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