[cryptography] Here's What Law Enforcement Can Recover From A Seized iPhone

Jeffrey Walton noloader at gmail.com
Thu Mar 28 01:37:00 EDT 2013


On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 11:37 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg <jeffrey at goldmark.org> wrote:
> On Mar 24, 2013, at 5:30 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I wonder how they are doing it when other tools fails.
>
> ... In the other cases, the phones did have a passcode lock, but
> with 10000 possible four digit codes it takes about 40 minutes to run
> through all given how Apple has calibrated PBKDF2 on these (4 trials per
> second).
Does rooting and Jailbreaking invalidate evidence collection? Do
hardware manufacturers and OS vendors have alternate methods? For
example, what if LE wanted/needed iOS 4's hardware key? I suspect
Apple has the methods/processes to provide it.

I think there's much more to it than a simple brute force.

> I've been recommending that people turn off "simple passcode" on iOS devices
> and move to at least six digits. If your non-simple passcode is all digits,
> you are still get the numeric keypad.
Yes good advice. The platform's data protection on hardware encryption
keys is a good start.

Jeff


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