[cryptography] Design Strategies for Defending against Backdoors

ianG iang at iang.org
Tue Nov 19 02:09:17 EST 2013


On 18/11/13 20:58 PM, Thierry Moreau wrote:
> ianG wrote:
>> On 18/11/13 10:27 AM, ianG wrote:
>>> In the cryptogram sent over the weekend, Bruce Schneier talks about how
>>> to design protocols to stop backdoors.  Comments?
>>
>>
>> To respond...
>>
>>> https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/defending_again_1.html
>>>
>>> Design Strategies for Defending against Backdoors
>>>
>
> ...
>
>>>      Encryption protocols should be designed so as not to leak any
>>> random information. Nonces should be considered part of the key or
>>> public predictable counters if possible. Again, the goal is to make it
>>> harder to subtly leak key bits in this information.
>>
>>
>> Right, that I agree with.  Packets should be deterministically created
>> by the sender, and they should be verifiable by the recipient.
>>
>
> Then you lose the better theoretical foundations of probabilistic
> signature schemes ...


If you're talking here about an authenticated request, that should be 
layered within an encryption packet IMHO, it should be the business content.

iang



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