[cryptography] Quality of HAVEGE algorithm for entropy?
smueller at chronox.de
Wed Nov 27 15:39:12 EST 2013
Am Mittwoch, 27. November 2013, 12:00:50 schrieb coderman:
> On Wed, Nov 27, 2013 at 3:10 AM, Stephan Mueller <smueller at chronox.de>
> > ...
> > The way haveged is implemented, not really. The reason is that it uses
> > clock_gettime, which uses the Linux kernel clocksource framework. That
> > framework has drivers for a number of different timers on various
> > architectures.
> do you know if the list of supported clock sources is documented
Yes, it is documented. Check the contents of
Note, current_clocksource is also writable where you can switch the used
> > ... you cannot verify
> > entropy beyond simple pattern checks. Moreover, compression (i.e.
> > whitening) is not meaningful when mixing it into /dev/random as it has
> > own whitening function.
> simple checks (sanity checks) are useful.
I fully agree to have simple sanity checks. Though I would not call them
checks for entropy.
| Cui bono? |
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