[cryptography] Quality of HAVEGE algorithm for entropy?
smueller at chronox.de
Thu Nov 28 04:30:32 EST 2013
Am Donnerstag, 28. November 2013, 10:19:08 schrieb Joachim Strömbergson:
> Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > I would not concur with this statment: at runtime, you cannot verify
> > entropy beyond simple pattern checks. Moreover, compression (i.e.
> > whitening) is not meaningful when mixing it into /dev/random as it
> > has its own whitening function.
> What I have argumented for is to have sanity checks on the sources to at
> least capture pathological cases. Things like stuck at zero/one. Then
> one could add simpler tests to detect major bias and values spanning
> much less than the value space.
In this case, I fully concur that such tests are feasible and desireable.
| Cui bono? |
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