[cryptography] /dev/random is not robust

coderman coderman at gmail.com
Mon Oct 14 21:07:57 EDT 2013


On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 5:35 PM,  <dj at deadhat.com> wrote:
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338.pdf

"...it remains unclear if these attacks lead to actual exploitable
vulnerabilities
in practice."

in my mtrngd for XSTORE i not only fed /dev/random when it became
write-able (entropy less than full) but also fed it at regular
intervals, specifically to keep the pool fresh.

in the standard rng-tools rngd, you specify this parameter with the
timeout parameter,
"Interval written to random-device when the entropy pool is full, in
seconds (default: 60)"

i am pleased to see this made it into the stock rngd source!


best regards,


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