[cryptography] HTML List Abuse (was: "please ignore: this is only a test")

John Young jya at pipeline.com
Sat Oct 19 10:59:12 EDT 2013


Wait, numbbutt whiners, there is gold in those duplicates, triplicates.

Eugen's multiple posts are not identical. Best save them all
for the quite valuable and revealing metadata which differs
for each. That metadata's value usually exceeds the stupid
bitchings rancid and senseless as oh so witty tweets.

And responses from the various fora also differ and provide
information and metadata which may be senselessly filtered,
typical comsec arrogantly foot shooting and blinding to score
points of utter insignificance except to metadata profiling of
the gullbile whiners and tut-tutters and tutors.

Peer closely: you will see that Eugen is working his ass off
on behalf of metadata planters, siphoners and exploiters who
designed and run all levels and permutations of open and
secret Internet, doing damn fine pinging and backstabbing
as high-level trained to do, to work in wolf packs against
sheeps gamboling as if their herder was the absolutely
incorruptible RISKS operator, planter, siphoner, exploiter,
redesigner of an even more pernicious Internet gobbler.


At 10:22 AM 10/19/2013, you wrote:
>On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:40:19PM +0200, Mob wrote:
>
> > Also, if you don't want to miss anything, you are probably
> > subscribing to the cypherpunks, cryptography at randombits,
> > cryptography at metzdowd and cryptopolitics (low volume at the moment)
> > lists, often receiving a hundred postings every day, or more.
> > Including doubles and triples reposted by Eugene Leitl. To scan
>
>I'm highly sympathetic to your plight, and suggest the
>following solution: install a procmail recipe to filter
>out dupes with the same message ID (e.g. 
><5261AAC3.6050102 at mbox301.swipnet.se>
>in case of the mail I'm replying to) and/or matching Resent-Message-ID: with
>leitl.org behind it.
>
>http://help.cs.umn.edu/email/procmail
>
> > these postings with the quick-browse/delete-method (3-4 posts a
> > second) is significantly, irritatingly slower if you have to wait
> > for the fractions of a second that the HTML needs to load.




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