[cryptography] Authenticated Time Synchronization

Stephen Röttger stephen.roettger at gmail.com
Tue Sep 3 05:06:56 EDT 2013


> Specifically a client can generate a unique 128-bit nonce and have the trusted server timestamp it by signing a message including the nonce and the current time T. If the time between the request and the reply was dt, the actual time must be in the range (T, dt)
> 
> We can then extend this to an arbitrary number of clients with a merkle tree and one or more levels of untrusted servers. The servers combine all the nonces they receive in some time interval t into a merkle tree, then timestamp the digest of the tip of that tree. The clients then receive the merkle paths from the server, a proof of log2(n) size.
I'm not sure if I understand you correctly. Do you mean that a time
server will store the nonces of all requests from different clients in a
given period and afterwards publish a merkle tree of these requests with
a signed root node? I think this approach would have roughly the same
computing overhead as our approach: one asymmetric signature per time
period vs. one asymmetric signature per client and then ~2 hashes per
time request vs. 3 in our approach.

> If a client doesn't trust the server at all, they know the time is within (T, dt); if they are willing to place some trust in the server the server can measure the interval between when they got the request and sent the proof, dt', and the client can take that into account for a more precise time. 
If the server is not trusted, what prevents him from lying to the client
and just forging some merkle tree in this case?


More information about the cryptography mailing list