[cryptography] regarding the NSA crypto "breakthrough"

d.nix d.nix at comcast.net
Thu Sep 5 20:40:12 EDT 2013


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First time caller, recent listener...

In regards to this:

> 
> Back to the latest failure to reveal technical docs. Those who know
> what's important about them are not likely to tell journalists
> that, may be incapable of doing so in a way that journalists can
> apply their vaunted skepticism of sources -- using word skills of
> truthiness. So what is transferred are narratives, stories,
> rhetoric, bombast, in lieu of technical specs, math, algorithms,
> fabrication drawings, chemical and electrical formulations, doses
> of EM and anti-EM just precisely zapped to the nano-fullerine
> /->^256/1029: the myrrh and honey of technies, sleep-eeze to the
> wordies who yawn is that a go or no go to slick brochure printing.
> 

In reading this:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance

My take away is the Scheiner is now on board advising Greenwald and
company and is *reading* the Snowden documents for himself.

Quote:

For the past two weeks, I have been working with the Guardian on NSA
stories, and have read hundreds of top-secret NSA documents provided
by whistleblower Edward Snowden. I wasn't part of today's story – it
was in process well before I showed up – but everything I read
confirms what the Guardian is reporting.

And:

5) Try to use public-domain encryption that has to be compatible with
other implementations. For example, it's harder for the NSA to
backdoor TLS than BitLocker, because any vendor's TLS has to be
compatible with every other vendor's TLS, while BitLocker only has to
be compatible with itself, giving the NSA a lot more freedom to make
changes. And because BitLocker is proprietary, it's far less likely
those changes will be discovered. Prefer symmetric cryptography over
public-key cryptography. Prefer conventional discrete-log-based
systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that
the NSA influences when they can.

Since I started working with Snowden's documents, I have been using
GPG, Silent Circle, Tails, OTR, TrueCrypt, BleachBit, and a few other
things I'm not going to write about. There's an undocumented
encryption feature in my Password Safe program from the command line);
I've been using that as well.

===========

I'm personally happy to see Bruce directly involved in this, seeing as
he's also directly involved with the EFF and other critical
organizations and has the technical know-how to understand the
implications of what the docs say.

Regards,

Dave

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