[cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors
coderman at gmail.com
Mon Sep 9 01:10:09 EDT 2013
On Sun, Sep 8, 2013 at 10:05 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:
> none of these are compelling reasons to not release raw access to the
> entropy stream from hardware noise sources.*
* i meant to add, there have been various justifications put forth.
again, none of them compelling. for every potential risk to the RDRAND
/ RDSEED consumers, there is a trivial way to reset / reseed / refill
the system in a way that could accommodate both raw access to the
entropy bits while retaining the assurances of RDRAND / RDSEED.
and for every claim that such a transition represents an opportunity
for DoS, there is a trivial elevated permissions which could
accommodate such transitions only when authorized.
and so forth and so on, to no effect. the lines have been drawn, and
nothing will convince Intel to release raw access to the entropy
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