[cryptography] [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength

ianG iang at iang.org
Sun Sep 22 08:32:42 EDT 2013

On 19/09/13 00:23 AM, Lucky Green wrote:

> According to published reports that I saw, NSA/DoD pays $250M (per
> year?) to backdoor cryptographic implementations. I have knowledge of
> only one such effort. That effort involved DoD/NSA paying $10M to a
> leading cryptographic library provider to both implement and set as
> the default the obviously backdoored Dual_EC_DRBG as the default RNG.

So, boom.  Once the finger is pointed so directly, this came tumbling 
down within a day or two.


One mystery is left for me.  Why so much?  It clearly doesn't cost that 
much money to implement the DRBG, or if it did, I would have done it for 
$5m, honest injun!  Nor would it cost that to test it nor to deploy it 
on mass.  Documentation, etc.

What are we to conclude was the reason for such a high cost?  Conscience 
sedative?  Internal payoffs?

> This was $10M wasted. While this vendor may have had a dominating
> position in the market place before certain patents expired, by the
> time DoD/NSA paid the $10M, few customers used that vendor's
> cryptographic libraries.

Another theory - take a fool's money?

And, what happens to RSA now?  If this is business-as-usual, does this 
mean that when the Feds show up to my door with 'a proposal' that I 
should see the mutual interest in sharing my customer's data with them 
by means ecliptic & exotic?  Take the 30 pieces of silver (adj. for 2000 
years of inflation), and be happy they're also keeping my struggling 
business in the black?  Or grey?

Or, is it the new Crypto AG?  Is RSA the new byword for sellout?  Does 
RSA go out of business?  An Arthur Anderson event?

In which case I have no choice.  I have a reason to preserve the privacy 
of my customers, and tell the NSA I'm not interested in their cyanide 
pill patriotism.


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