[cryptography] Dual_EC_DRBG was cooked, but not AES?

Lodewijk andré de la porte l at odewijk.nl
Sun Sep 22 15:46:00 EDT 2013


2013/9/22 Tony Arcieri <bascule at gmail.com>

> Furthermore, 3DES continues to remain a viable cipher.


I, personally, find that a most commendable and remarkable fact. To use DES
with longer keying (and more rounds) is, to this very day, a solid choice.
It makes one wonder why the longer keys weren't used before, doesn't it
make you feel safer that your secret will remain that way until long after
you die?

Performance issues in cryptography are an interesting problem. Both the
safety and inconvenience are in it. It is my preposition that the security
has been minimized too often, and too much.

Longer keys, stronger crypto. This is what I would like to see.

I still think simplicity is something largely ignored in the algorithms.
DES is a *fairly* simple arrangement, AES definitely doesn't improve upon
it. It still seems strange to me that *tricks*, because that's what they
are, require so much trickery.

A simple purpose, a simple solution. You'd imagine.

The simplest algorithm would be the simplest trick to figure out, to undo
the trickery of. Anything more complex would be more difficult to undo, but
will it be more computationally expensive? Are we increasing human effort
or computer effort?

Regarding this topic: typically I'm always disappointed in groups by two
things. The first is the capacity of the group. The second is the kind of
effort being performed to achieve a goal. Usually groups display much
lesser capabilities than individuals do. And the groups will not perform
outside their parameters, meaning they do much less than you'd think they
do to achieve their goals.

I doubt AES is subverted through partaking in the contest. But as those at
the competition I wonder about the abilities of the immense amounts of
cryptographers possibly employed at the NSA. They're careful though. Maybe
we won't ever find out.
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