[cryptography] secure deletion on SSDs (Re: Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption)
michael at briarproject.org
Tue Sep 24 04:36:59 EDT 2013
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On 24/09/13 00:18, Adam Back wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 01:39:35PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
>> Apple came within a whisker of solving the problem in iOS by
>> creating an 'effaceable storage' area within the flash storage,
>> which bypasses block remapping and can be deleted securely.
>> However, iOS only uses the effaceable storage for resetting the
>> entire device (by deleting the key that encrypts the user's
>> filesystem), not for securely deleting individual files.
> Hmm well thats interesting no? With the ability to securely
> delete a single key you can probably use that to selectively delete
> files with an appropriate key management structure. eg without
> optimizing that, you could have a table of per file keys, encrypted
> with the master key. To delete a given file you'd re-encrypt
> everything in the file table to a new key, except the deleted file,
> and delete, then over-rewrite this "effaceable storage" area.
Yes, absolutely, that's what makes it so frustrating - they already
have per-file encryption keys with user-selectable key management
policies and a hierarchy of keybags - adding a policy for efficient
secure deletion would be a small amount of work. But it's work that
would have to be done by Apple, not in userland.
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