[cryptography] The Compromised Internet

John Young jya at pipeline.com
Wed Sep 25 17:28:37 EDT 2013

At 04:21 PM 9/25/2013, you wrote:
>About your only choices are hams or (slightly higher budget)
>microsats with onboard flash and DTN (notice you can deliver
>packets during flyby). Hams also do launch microsats,
>so there's some overlap. I've been waiting for consumer
>phased arrays, just saw Locata VRay today -- perhaps not
>for much longer now. Prime your phased array with s00per-s3kr1t
>sat ephemerides, and you're good to go. Really hard to
>jam, too -- optical ones impossible to jam, even.
>For very high latency you could just use a global sneakernet.
>http://what-if.xkcd.com/31/ has some numbers. You could probably
>already run stock Usenet over uucp over that.

Yes, I understand some of these, maybe all, are used for mil-gov-spy
communications, likely in pretty advanced versions, and long in use
before and with the internet. But not for high-value comsec of the
present era.

Mil-gov-spy use of and spying on the internet and commercial-grade
encryption, https and the like, for low-value communications should
indicate much better and more varied means are used for high-value.

Smil, intelnet, nsanet, and other intra-IC networks are minimally secure,
advertised and touted on internet outlets, thus typical fat food for
foodies at lower levels of clearance.

Commercial-grade comsec, which is all the public has have access to,
appears tailored by standards setting and selective crypto competitons to
convince of reliability. Openness promoted as a seal of approval.

Fine propaganda that. Now what about what is not known openly. Well,
that is what's below Snowden's tip of the iceberg slides, papers and
briefings. Where's the hardware specs? 

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