[cryptography] Question About Best Practices for Personal File Encryption
iang at iang.org
Sun Aug 17 15:44:46 EDT 2014
On 17/08/2014 19:39 pm, Ryan Carboni wrote:
> Or in the case of OpenSSL, no one notices the backdoor as it is
> indistinguishable from an obscure programming error.
The difference between a corporate backdoor and an open source backdoor
is likely that when it is finally discovered, the corporate
embarrassment is still easy enough to suppress: NDAs are a weapon.
Sunlight is your friend. The many eyeballs thing doesn't really find
any more bugs, it seems, but it certainly guarantees a scandal. The
agencies don't go where the sunlight is brightest.
> On Sun, Aug 17, 2014 at 5:01 AM, ianG <iang at iang.org
> <mailto:iang at iang.org>> wrote:
> On 17/08/2014 05:09 am, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote:
> > On 2014-08-16, at 4:51 PM, David I. Emery <die at dieconsulting.com
> <mailto:die at dieconsulting.com>> wrote:
> > I do think, however, that if there are such backdoors, it would have
> > to be known to only a very small number of people. Too many of the
> > who work on Apple security would blow the whistle. So it would have to
> > be introduced in such a way that most of the people who actually
> > these tools are unaware of the backdoors. It’s certainly possible, but
> > it does shift balance of plausibility.
> Right. As I understand it, the standard way that this is done is to
> create a special features group in another closely-allied country. That
> group secures permission from HQ to do some rework for their "special
> national needs."
> That group then inserts in the backdoor, then ships the entire patch off
> to HQ. Unless the center is reviewing for obfuscated tricks from a
> trusted partner, the backdoor slides in, and nobody knows it is there.
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