[cryptography] [Cryptography] basing conclusions on facts

ianG iang at iang.org
Sun Jun 15 14:16:59 EDT 2014

On 15/06/2014 14:37 pm, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> I've no public opinion on Certicom's patent practices. And the
> behaviour of the signals intelligence agencies has been IMO
> deplorable. So I sympathise with some of what you are saying.
> However, building your case on bogus claims that are not facts
> as you are pearly doing is a really bad idea. In particular...
> On 15/06/14 14:13, ianG wrote:
>> What is also curious is that Dan
>> Brown is highly active in the IETF working groups for crypto, 
> That is not correct as far as I can see. In my local archives,
> I see one email from him to the TLS list in 2011 and none in
> 2012. For the security area list (saag), I see a smattering
> of mails in 2011 and 2012 and none in 2013. For the IRTF's
> CFRG, I see a few in 2010, none in 2011 and some in 2012 and
> 2013. I do see increased participation over the last year on
> the the DUAL-EC topic.
> None of the above is anywhere near "highly active" which is
> therefore simply false.
> And I don't believe you yourself are sufficiently active to
> judge whether or not someone else is "highly active" in the
> IETF to be honest. Nor do you seem to have gone through the
> mail list archives to check.

For my part, I had seen his name only with respect to IETF WGs.  However
I admit that I do not follow IETF security WGs closely, so am not
qualified to assert "highly active."  You are right, I am wrong.

> You are both of course welcome to become highly active if you
> do want to participate, same as anyone else.
>> adding
>> weight to the claim that the IETF security area is corrupted.
> And that supposed conclusion, based only on an incorrect claim,
> is utter nonsense. I would have expected better logic and closer
> adherence to the facts.
> Yes, the IETF security area needs to do better, and quite a few
> folks are working on that. Yes, its almost certain the someone
> was paid by BULLRUN to muck up IETF work. Nonetheless unfounded
> misstatements such as the above don't help and are wrong. And
> the correct reaction is to do better work and not to fall for
> the same guily-by-association fallacy that the leads the spooks
> to think that pervasive monitoring is a good plan.

I had a long post addressing this issue, but as it takes us further from
the subject at hand, I'll pull my head from out of the rabbit hole.


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