[cryptography] Commercialized Attack Hardware on SmartPhones

coderman coderman at gmail.com
Mon Mar 10 03:22:23 EDT 2014

On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 7:33 AM, Tom Ritter <tom at ritter.vg> wrote:
> Hey all, wondering if anyone knows of any commercialized hardware
> (e.g. developed into a product, not just a research paper) that
> conducts attacks on powered-on, Full Disk Encrypted Android/iPhone
> phones that _isn't_ PIN guessing?

how's your security clearance Tom?


> A powered-on FDE-ed iPhone or Android can also be attacked ...

i have an interesting tale to tell about the FDE crypto bypass techniques.

it's easiest when the device(target) is HOT!

... and exploitation triggers
  are tailored around pilfering keys when volumes are active.

> I don't believe you can do a DMA attack against most Android phones -

the various baseband talks detail how this is not really relevant,
 and totally vulnerable.
  we're not in desktop model anymore, Dorothy.

> Chip-off attacks are very unlikely.  AFAIK
> iPhone jailbreaks require you to unlock your phone for technical
> reasons, so those aren't possible without an unlocked phone (although
> I'm not positive about that.)

also not true.  see also your lack of citing threat models...

> Does anyone know about anything in this space?

... you remind me of me when i was young, idealistic, and naive ;)

> Where an 'ordinary' law enforcement agency
> could shortcut a > strong passphrase on a phone technically?

"don't cast your pearls before swine"

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