[cryptography] Paris Attacks Blamed on Strong Cryptography and Edward Snowden

Givon Zirkind givonne at gmx.com
Tue Dec 1 06:43:03 EST 2015

the logical choice, as absurd as it may seem, is actually 3. allow for 
the occassional terrorist success.
because, empirically, it works that way.  it does happen from to time 
even with all our current measures.  and, intuitively, the high level 
surveillance doesn't catch these ppl anyway.  these are people who 
really really don't want to be found.  ex. heightened airport security 
hasn't caught terrorists. lots of petty thieves and money launderers. 
but, no terrorists.

On 12/1/2015 12:19 AM, dan at geer.org wrote:
> In dealing with high level decision makers, the best strategy is
> always to provide three options and have the decision maker choose
> amongst them.  Taking the American electorate as that high level
> decision maker, I would find it refreshing were Brennan to present
> said electorate with the choice between [1] content analysis (hence
> crypto side doors and the exposure of content), [2] traffic analysis
> (hence data retention at a level heretofore unseen and the cataloged
> exposure of real social networks), and [3] a willing resolve to tolerate
> the occasional terrorist success.  It is a choice amongst losses.
> --dan
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