[cryptography] Original Bitcoin Paper Announced on Cryptography Mail List
jya at pipeline.com
Thu Dec 10 09:26:10 EST 2015
From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>
To: cypherpunks at al-qaeda.net, gold-silver-crypto at rayservers.com
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Subject: Fwd: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper
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Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2008 20:20:14 -0400
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Begin forwarded message:
> From: "Satoshi Nakamoto" <satoshi at vistomail.com>
> Date: October 31, 2008 2:10:00 PM GMT-04:00
> To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
> Subject: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper
> I've been working on a new electronic cash system that's fully
> peer-to-peer, with no trusted third party.
> The paper is available at:
> The main properties:
> Double-spending is prevented with a peer-to-peer network.
> No mint or other trusted parties.
> Participants can be anonymous.
> New coins are made from Hashcash style proof-of-work.
> The proof-of-work for new coin generation also powers the
> network to prevent double-spending.
> Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
> Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would
> allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another
> without the burdens of going through a financial institution.
> Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main
> benefits are lost if a trusted party is still required to prevent
> double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending
> problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps
> transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based
> proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without
> redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as
> proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came
> from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as honest nodes control
> the most CPU power on the network, they can generate the longest
> chain and outpace any attackers. The network itself requires
> minimal structure. Messages are broadcasted on a best effort basis,
> and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the
> longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they
> were gone.
> Full paper at:
> Satoshi Nakamoto
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