[cryptography] The Wandering Music Band

Michael Rogers michael at briarproject.org
Thu Jan 8 07:38:58 EST 2015


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On 08/01/15 07:03, realcr wrote:
> I think the naive solution I proposed in my first message is more 
> efficient than using Bitcoin, because it does not involve proof of
> work or flooding stuff.
> 
> Shortly: Whenever a person is added to the band, all the members
> sign on the new list. Whenever a member leaves the band, all the
> members sign on the new list. The band members keep the signatures
> forever, so they can always prove they where formed originally from
> the original band S.

I think there might be a problem if a majority of members leave the
band one by one and then construct an alternative history:

band_0 = {a,b,c,d}  // original lineup
band_1 = {a,b,c}    // d leaves
band_2 = {a,b,c,e}  // e joins
band_3 = {a,b,e}    // c leaves
band_4 = {a,b,e,f}  // f joins
band_5 = {a,e,f}    // b leaves
band_6 = {a,e,f,g}  // g joins

Now the original members b,c,d create an alternative history:

band_0 = {a,b,c,d}  // original lineup
band_1' = {b,c,d}   // a leaves
band_2' = {b,c,d,h} // h joins

Which is the true lineup, band_6 or band_2'?

A verifier who's seen both histories can tell that b and c have signed
inconsistent statements. But how can a verifier know whether they've
seen all histories that might exist?

Cheers,
Michael
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