[cryptography] Enranda: 4MB/s Userspace TRNG

Russell Leidich pkejjy at gmail.com
Tue May 26 16:57:03 EDT 2015


Hi coderman,

I would welcome your longer reply, which would surely interest others here,
as well. For starters, how do you envision this BTC boundary attack
occurring? And yes, it's totally legit to attack Enranda by executing a
process on the same CPU, for example, in another terminal window on a
single-CPU system. For that matter, what other attacks do you foresee?

I won't argue with your point about hardware TRNGs being superior to
software ones. If you trust your chip vendor, then it all works just fine.

Russell Leidich

On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 7:47 PM, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:

> On 5/26/15, coderman <coderman at gmail.com> wrote:
> > ...
> > others may provide constructive criticism, as you seem sincere in your
> > desire for building useful entropy collection. but this solution is
> > worse than nothing, as it provides absurd claims of false security.
>
>
> speaking of,
> '''
>  'If you can demonstrate that Enranda is biased in a measurable way,
> or simply buggy, then you rock.'''
>  - how about a BTC bounty to show any amount of bias, even against
> local attacker sharing processor?  then i'll at least write a longer
> reply :P
>
>
> best regards,
>    a lover and hater of unpredictability and entropy, most of all when
> they diverge!
>
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