[cryptography] Enranda: 4MB/s Userspace TRNG
coderman at gmail.com
Tue May 26 18:05:26 EDT 2015
On 5/26/15, Russell Leidich <pkejjy at gmail.com> wrote:
> I would welcome your longer reply,
you are patient and friendly in response to me,
a jerk flinging opinions!
i will send a longer response about my specific concerns for these
types of entropy gathering when time permits - thank you for courtesy
> ... how do you envision this BTC...
Bounty, as in compensation for a successful attack in the form of
digital currency :P
no matter, i am compelled to delineate concerns and risks, as said above.
> And yes, it's totally legit to attack Enranda by executing a
> process on the same CPU, for example, in another terminal window on a
> single-CPU system. For that matter, what other attacks do you foresee?
i am glad the post-quantum hardness has constraints, regarding the rest,
as said above.
> I won't argue with your point about hardware TRNGs being superior to
> software ones. If you trust your chip vendor, then it all works just fine.
i trust them more if the design provides raw sample access and the
observed entropy density, bias, failure modes, as observed over
extended sanity and continuous run-checks on the sampled bit stream.
... CPU instructions another tangent, which i've written about
separately wrt RDRAND/RDSEED vs. XSTORE entropy sources.
best regards, and my apologies for first,
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