[cryptography] This is bad. THis is really bad. (Isn't it?)

mtm marctmiller at gmail.com
Wed Nov 25 12:03:02 EST 2015

fear not, mikey d is on it:


due diligence aside, wats with dell and pfx files?

On Nov 25, 2015 10:39 AM, "Jeffrey Walton" <noloader at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 9:16 AM, Dave Howe
> <davehowe.pentesting at gmail.com> wrote:
> > On 25/11/2015 12:59, Florian Schütz wrote:
> >> This is true for Chrome and, I think, for Firefox as well. Some
> >> enterprises insist on MITMing TLS connections at a proxy, and at least
> >> Chrome will not break this. They argue if they were to strictly
> >> enforce Pins, people would just switch to a more permissive browser. I
> >> agree with their line of thought.
> > Yup. Firefox of course isn't aware of this Dell key, as it is in the
> > windows keystore, so will fail to validate such a certificate....
> Chrome will fall victim because they use the OS store
> (http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy)...
> Chrome will even break a known good pinset. Priorities of
> Constituencies and all the other web/security model goodness
> (http://www.w3.org/TR/html-design-principles/#priority-of-constituencies).
> ..
> Jeff
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