[cryptography] [Cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised

John Young jya at pipeline.com
Tue Sep 15 18:39:15 EDT 2015


Correct analysis. First was get out a prompt notice to wave off users,
then proceed with other authentications. Toughest problem is how to
avoid another compromise of new keys since so many ways to do
that have arisen and/or suspected over the life of PGP and other
systems. WoT is problematic too, as are key signing parties, and
so on. Other systems claim to be better, and we are using some of
them, waiting and watching and suspecting are the lessons learned
from stalwart testbed PGP in all its guises and disguises.

We likely would not have discovered the compromises if not for
those lessons.

Nor do we mind starting from scratch, perhaps a bit more often
than 11 years. Tornados do happen out side alleys of easy
prediction (this is not a cyphersec sales motto).

At 04:22 PM 9/15/2015, Paul Wouters wrote:
>On Tue, 15 Sep 2015, John Young wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED 
>MESSAGE----- by unknown key. > I have learned today that all PGP 
>public keys of John Young > <jya at pipeline.com> and Cryptome 
><cryptome at earthlink.net> have been > compromised. > The keys have 
>been revoked today. Revocation could have been done by the person 
>who stole the keys too. That in itself is not good enough. > Two new 
>keys have been generated today: > > John Young 15-0915 
><jya at pipeline.com> 0xD87D436C > Cryptome 15-0915 
><cryptome at earthlink.net> 0x8CD47BD5 Which I cannot find on either 
>pgp.mit.edu or pgp.surfnet.nl. I did find them on keyserver.pgp.com, 
>but I don't know who runs it and with the additional captcha 
>software, no idea if that is compromised :P It is announced using 
>short keyids, not to be trusted, and no finger prints although we 
>can get those from the key used to sign this message I guess. $ gpg 
>--list-sigs D87D436C pub   4096R/D87D436C 2015-09-15 
>uid                  John Young 15-0915 <jya at pipeline.com> 
>sig      N   D87D436C 2015-09-15  John Young 15-0915 
><jya at pipeline.com> sig          CA57AD7C 2015-09-15  [User ID not 
>found] sub   4096R/79F82F3B 2015-09-15 sig          D87D436C 
>2015-09-15  John Young 15-0915 <jya at pipeline.com> $ gpg --list-sigs 
>8CD47BD5 pub   4096R/8CD47BD5 2015-09-15 
>uid                  Cryptome 15-0915 <cryptome at earthlink.net> 
>sig      N   8CD47BD5 2015-09-15  Cryptome 15-0915 
><cryptome at earthlink.net> sig          CA57AD7C 2015-09-15  [User ID 
>not found] sub   4096R/27BCF5FB 2015-09-15 sig          8CD47BD5 
>2015-09-15  Cryptome 15-0915 <cryptome at earthlink.net> The keys are 
>both announced but not signed by each other? I fetched CA57AD7C 
>which has 6863 signatures on it. It seems to be some PGP global 
>directory key, signed by a few people I know, but still seems to be 
>only proof that it came from the keyserver, not that the key 
>actually belongs to you. > This message is signed by the first. But 
>is that first key signed by the old keys? (which of course could 
>also have been done by the attacker, so you need to re-start a web 
>of trust with some of your personal confidants. > -----BEGIN PGP 
>SIGNATURE----- from an unknown key - with no direct signatures of 
>any known trustable key run by a human. Paul 
>_______________________________________________ The cryptography 
>mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com 
>http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography




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