[cryptography] The Natseckers

mtm marctmiller at gmail.com
Mon Feb 29 00:46:16 EST 2016


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Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 05:30:03 +0000
Message-ID: <CAD7u51nOeRotMcwcK=
k1ssHX+o5bq8KcwobWwLX2j-R_s7uhRw at mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [cryptography] The Natseckers
From: mtm <marctmiller at gmail.com>
To: John Young <jya at pipeline.com>
Cc: cryptography at metzdowd.com, cryptome at freelists.org,
        Givon Zirkind <givonne at gmx.com>, cryptography at randombit.net,
cypherpunks at cpunks.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114d5f06ddb7dd052ce1f085
On Feb 28, 2016 4:52 AM, "John Young" <jya at pipeline.com> wrote:

> DoJ is required to cloak NSA-CIA capabilities by pretending full sharing
> does not take place. Redacted and excluded filings and decisions by DoJ,
> district, appeal, SCOTUS and FISA courts along with open and classified
> executive orders by and POTUS, and best of all, classified contracts,
> implements this.
>
> In olden days there was a fairy-land time when NSA-CIA were required to
> cull,
> select and "minimize" (except in wartime and emergencies) their take and
> capabilities with FBI and law enforcement, but no longer, the Patriot Act
> Dr Zeuss loosened the ties that never bound.
>
> Going to court melodramatizes and sanitizes the bung-holing (like USG v.
> Apple)
> with in camera, withholding, stonewalling and denying. It should be
> understood,
> Dear Dummies, that lawyers, security clearance holders, corporations, NGOs
> and
> and greeders who assist and abet spying understand how to play this
> rigged game to keep the public "safe and secure" in blissful passivity.
>
> Encryption, necessarily quietly compromised for dependable marketability,
> has always been a formulaic-algorithmic Faustian character in the
> comsec-infosec charade where official secrecy triumphs over chaotic
> rabble-empowering democracy.
>
> This big-budget high-profit Broadway performance is called "The
> Natseckers."
>
> At 08:06 PM 2/27/2016, you wrote:
>
>> isn't there supposed to be "sharing" when it comes to terrorism.
>> patriot act & such.
>>
>> Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 at 2:15 PM From: "John Young" <
>> jya at pipeline.com> To: "Henry Baker" <hbaker1 at pipeline.com>,
>> cypherpunks at cpunks.org, cryptome at freelists.org, cryptography at metzdowd.com,
>> cryptography at randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography]
>> USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order
>> At 11:13 AM 2/26/2016, Henry Baker wrote: >If this interpretation of the
>> All Writs Act is upheld, then the DOJ >will have to consult with the
>> intelligence community prior to >compelling companies like Apple to decrypt
>> phones. It would be quite >interesting for DOJ to publicly stipulate that
>> NSA could (or could >not) break into iOS 8 or 9. This is truly a sticky
>> wicket, since the >intelligence community is generally prohibited from
>> working on >domestic issues. We asked for an opinion of Michael Froomkin,
>> Law Professor at University of Miami, on Henry Baker's comments: <
>> https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm>
>> https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm
>> _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list
>> cryptography at randombit.net <
>> http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography>
>> http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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